No Fault  Divorce: Changing  Divorce Laws in Zimbabwe. by Ncube, Welshman

EDITORIAL BOARD
Professor R H Austin, BA, LLB (Cape Town), LLM (London), Legal Practitioner 
W Ncube BL, M Phil (UZ)
P Lewin BA (Rhodes), LLB (Cape Town), Legal Practitioner
S B O Gutto, LLB (Nairobi), MALD (Tufts) Dip. Int & Comp Law of Human Rights 
(Strasbourg)
Feltoe, BA (Rhodes), LLB (Lond), M Phil (Kent), Legal Practitioner 
A Armstrong, AB (Brown), JD (Boston)
T J Nyapadi, SRN, BA (Hons) Law, (South Bank), LLM (Lond) FMIT (Lond) 
Barrister-at-Law (Lincolns Inn), Legal Practitioner 
M Maboreke BL, M Phil (UZ)
D A B  Robinson, BA (Cape), MA (Oxon), Legal Practitioner 
F G Smith, BL, LLB (Rhodes), Dip AIA (Eng) Legal Practitioner 
K Makamure, LLB & LLM (Lond)
J Stewart, LLB (Lond)
P Nherere, BL Hons (UZ), LLM (Camb) BCL (Oxon)
— E Magad.e, BL, LLB, M Phil (UZ)
B Hlatshwayo BL (UZ) LLM (Harvard)
S Nzombe BL (UZ) LLM (Lond)
C Gorodema BL & LLB (UZ) LLM (Lond)
V Nkiwane BL (UZ) LLM (Warwick)
M L Mhlaba, BL (UZ), Dip. Sp. Etudes Jur. Francaises, DEA-Droit Public (Pau)
L Tshuma, BL, LLB (UZ) LLM (Lond)
Issue Editors
W. Ncube, B Hlatshwayo and M. Maboreke
Faculty o f  Law 
University o f  Zimbabwe 










No Requiem for the Restraint ;
Doctrine- Yet P. N hcrcre......................................1
No Faull Divorce: Changing s
Divorce Laws in Zimbabwe W. N cube...........i...... ..................32
Corroboration and Rape Trials 
in Zimbabwe A. Armstrong 53
Women under Zimbabwean-La-w* ^
§  FThe Jurisprudence of ^ imitation j 
Clauses with Particular Reference 
to Section 1 of the; Canadian Charter 
of Rights and ITeddem* Q ;j
1 I o• ' .1 > £? ^  !'/The ILO and the RightTo Strike}
Law and Social Transformalibrj 
The Chilean Experiment"’
M.Mjrhoxck^., =64
L .X .M bunda...............................79
B. H. Simamba...... ......................95
V. Nkiwane................................ 107
Judges and Lawyers in Africa Today:
Their Powers, Competence and
Social Role S. B. 0 . Gulto............................134
The Legal Stalus of Parastalals:
Zimbabwe's Experience T. J. Nyapadi............................. 147
Case Notes and Comment
The Decision in Dube v Khumalo 
SC. 103-87: The Supreme Court 
Enforces an Illegal Contract? W. Ncubc 163
NO FAULT DIVORCE:
CHANGING DIVORCE LAWS IN ZIMBABWE
W elshman N cude*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act No. 11 of 
1987 there were two different sets of divorce laws in Zimbabwe, one applicable 
to monogamous marriages contracted under the general law and the other to 
potentially polygamous or polygamous marriages contracted in termsof custom­
ary law. Thus the dissolution of monogamous marriages contracted under the 
Marriage Act, Chapter 37, or under some foreign law look place in terms of 
Roman-Dutch common law and statute law whereas the dissolution of custom­
ary law marriages took place in accordance with customary law.
The Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act abolished this dichotomy and 
provided for a single divorce law applicable to both customary and general law 
marriages.
Because a full appreciation of the present divorce law is impossible without 
an understanding of the old divorce law it is instructive to begin by presenting 
the history of the divorce laws in Zimbabwe.
I HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
OF DIVORCE LAWS IN ZIMBABWE
A f  Under the General Law
r
At the time that the Roman-Dutch common law was introduced as the general 
law of Zimbabwe by Section 19 of thcHigh Commissioner’s Proclamation of 10 
June 1891, it recognized adultery arid malicious desertion as the only two 
grourids for divorce. These remained the only grounds until 1943 when the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, Chapter 39 was enacted. This Act, apart from attaching 
certain conditions to the common law ground of malicious desertion, introduced 
cruelly, incurable insanity and long term imprisonment as new grounds for 
divorce. There were now five grounds for divorce, all of them except for insanity 
being based squarely on the guilt principle in that they assumed the commission 
of a matrimonial offence by one or other of the spouses.
To obtain divorce on the ground of adultery the plaintiff had to prove 
voluntary sexual intercourse between his or her spouse and a third party.1 
Because the Roman-Dutch common law was based on the guilt principle a decree
* Lecturer, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe.
Note that because of its nature the act of adultery often has to be proved on the basis of 
circumstantial evidence, see Sidube v Miadlim'iss IIC-B-130-87.
Z. L . R ev . Vol. 6 1 9 8 8 33
of divorce on the ground of adultery could not be granted to a plaintiff who had 
himself or herself committed adultery. However, Roman-Dutch common law 
conferred a discretionary power on the court to condone the plaintiffs adultery 
if such condonation was in the interests of the parties and society as a whole.2 The 
effect of the condonation was to wipe out the plaintiff’s adultery and thereby 
entitle him or her to obtain divorce.
. It was possible for the innocent spouse to condone3 or forgive the adultery of 
the guilty spouse. Such condonation had the effect of wiping out the adultery and 
thereby making it impossible for the innocent spouse to rely on the condoned acts 
of adultery to obtain divorce.
For divorce to be granted on the ground of malicious desertion it had to be 
shown that the parties had been married for at least three years and that a period 
of at least six months had elapsed since the desertion.4 However, an action for 
divorce could be instituted before the expiration of either period provided that 
a final order of divorce could not be granted before the expiration of both periods.
Malicious desertion existed whenever one spouse deserted the other out of 
malice in order to put an end to the marriage. There are three main forms of 
malicious desertion, namely physical desertion,5 constructive desertion6 and 
refusal of conjugal rights or marital privileges^ . . .
To obtain divorce on the ground of cruelty the plaintiff was required to show 
that the defendant had, during the subsistence of the marriage, treated the 
plaintiff with such cruelty as made the continuance of married life insupport­
able.7 Habitual drunkenness or mental.cruelty which made the continuance of 
married life insupportable were all treated as cruelty for.purposes of divorce.8
Any conduct that is so grave and weighty as to cause, or be likely to cause, 
injury or reasonable apprehension of injury to the health of the other party 
amounts to cruelty. Thus to constitute cruelty in the legal sense conduct must be
2 See H. Hahlo, Ttie South African Law o f Husband and Wife, (4lh cd.) Juta, Durban, 1975 
pp.370-371 and Exparte F  1962(1) SA 48 (SR).
3 Condonation was understood as full forgiveness in the light of full knowledge — see Bell 
v Bell 1909 TS 500 at p.509 where Innes CJ stated that “The injured spouse must have 
knowledge of the offence, must fully forgive it and must be prepared to take back the guilty 
partner; the latter must be willing to accept forgiveness and to take advantage of the pardon 
and reconciliation must ensue”.
4 See section 2(1) of the repealed Matrimonial Causes Act, Chapter 39, which imposed these 
two conditions on the common law ground of malicious desertion.
5 Actual or physical desertion occurs when the defendant leaves the matrimonial home with 
the intention not to return.
6 Constmctive desertion consists of the innocent spouse leaving the matrimonial home 
because of the conduct of the defendant, who with the settled intention of bringing the 
marriage to an end, has driven the plaintiff away by making life in common dangerous or 
intolerable for the plaintiff. .
7 See section 3(c) of the repealed Matrimonial Causes Act, Chapter 39.
8 Section 6(1).
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“such as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or to give rise 
to a reasonable apprehension of such danger”.9 The conduct must be higher than 
the ordinary wear and tear of marriage to an extent that the plaintiff could not be 
expected to endure it.10 1
In the landmark case of Hill vH illu ihc, then Appellate .Division of the High 
Court of Rhodesia decided that there was no requirement in our law that to 
amount to cruelty the conduct complained of must have been intended by its 
perpetrator to be cruel towards the plaintiff. Accordingly, the case of Hill laid to 
rest the old notion that an intention to injure the other spouse was an essential 
clement of cruelly.12 In so doing our courts fojlowed the approach adopted by the 
English House of Lords in Collins v Gollins13 where it was held that an intention 
to injure or to be cruel Lo the other spouse was not an essential element of cruelty 
in divorce law.14
Divorce could also be obtained on the ground of insanity where it could be 
shown that the defendant had been under care and treaunent for a continuous 
period of 5 years or for interrupted periods which together amounted in the 
aggregate to at least 5 years, within the 10 years immediately preceding the 
divorce action.15 A plainliff seeking divorce on the ground of insanity had to 
establish four conditions, firstly, that the defendant was of unsound mind (that 
is, mentally disordered or defective); secondly, that he or she had been subject 
to the provisions of the Mental Disorders Act for a period of not less than 5 years; 
thirdly, that he or she was incurable16 and fourthly, that the plainliff was not to 
any appreciable extent to blame for the condition of the defendant.17
A divorce could be granted where the defendant had been convicted.of a 
crime and cither been:
(i) sentenced to imprisonment for 15 years or more; or
(ii) declared to be a habitual criminal under the provisions of the 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, Chapter 59 and after 
such sentence or declaration had been detained in prison for
9 Russel v Russel [1897] AC 395 al399. Sec also Le Brocq v Le Brocq [1964] 1 WLR 1085 
and Sheldon v Sheldon [1966] CA 62.
10 Crump v Crump [1965] 2 All RR 980.
11 1969 (3) SA 544 (RAD)
12 Sec “Cruelly in Rhodesia Divorce Law", 1969 RLJ 129 for a critique of the Hill v Hill 
decision.
13 [1963] 2 All ER 966.
14 Sec also Williams v Williams [1963] 2 All ER 994 where the House of Lords look the 
decision in Gollins v Gollins lo ils logical conclusion by holding that insanity was not 
necessarily a defence to an action for divorce based on cruelty.
15 Section 3(a) of Chapter 39.
16 A person is incurably insane whenever there is no reasonable hope that he or she will be 
restored lo a slate in which he or she will be capable of leading a normal social life. Sec 
Ridley v Ridley 1961 (1) SA 59 (SR).
17 Section 3(a) as read with Section 4. Sec also Thompson v Thompson 1958 (1) PRB 3.
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a continuous period of 5 years, or for interrupted periods 
which together amountedin the aggregate to at least 5 years, 
within the 10 years immediately preceding the commence­
ment of the divorce action.18
The court could refuse to grant a decree of divorce if it was satisfied that the 
plaintiff had voluntarily assisted the defendant in the commission of the crime 
or crimes of which he or she had been convicted.19
B. Under Customary Law
In pre-colonial Zimbabwe, the contract of marriage was legally and socially - 
recognized as being a contract between two families and not between the two 
spouses themselves and thus the power to dissolve a marriage vested in the two 
families. Accordingly, tribal courts of law did not entertain actions for divorce, 
save that they entertained disputes as to the amount of roora/lobolo returnable by 
the husband’s family on the dissolution of a marriage. The dissolution of 
marriage was clearly an extra-judicial affair. Goldin and Gelfand have pointed 
this out:
“Traditionally, divorce or dissolution of a marriage was arranged 
between the families of the respective parties. Tribal Courts did 
not entertain actions for divorce.”20
When the issue of the dissolution of a marriage arose the two families or their 
representatives met to decide on an appropriate course of action. They would 
agree to the dissolution of the marriage only if they thought the union had broken 
down to an unsalvagcablc extent.21
The colonial slate changed not only the forum for the dissolution of African 
marriages, but also the grounds upon which a customary law marriage could be 
dissolved. Section 17 of the Native Marriages Act22 provided that “no marriage 
solemnized under the Act or the Marriage Act or registered under the Native 
Marriage Act [Chapter 79 of 1939] or contracted under native law and custom23 
before the 1st April 1918 shall be dissolved except by an order of a competent 
court.”24
18 Section 3(b) of Chapter 39.
19 See Section 5 of Chapter 39.
20 Goldin and Gelfand, African Law and Custom in Rhodesia, Jula, Durban, 1876, at p.l 47.
21 Ibid, p. 148.
22 No. 23 of 1950.
23 Under the Native Marriage Act African customary unions were recognised as valid 
marriages and had to be dissolved by a court. By virtue of Section 3 of the African 
Marriages Act, Chapter 238, such unions arc no longer recognised and therefore need not 
be dissolved by a court. See also Jefita v James 1961 SRN 29 where it was held that a 
“husband” in a customary law union cannot divorce his “wife” because in law they arc not 
married to each other.
The provisions of this section arc now embodied in Section 16 of the African Marriages 
Act, Chapter 238.
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The power to dissolve customary law marriages whether solemnized under 
the African Marriages Act or by customary rites was vested in the Court of the 
Native Commissioners until 1969 when the African Law and Tribal Courts Act, 
Chapter 237 gave Tribal Courts the power to dissolve customary law marriages.
In granting divorce the colonial courts departed from the strictcustomary law 
regime under which a marriage was dissolved when it had broken down to such 
an extent that it was irreparable. The District Commissioner’s Courts gradually 
incorporated the guilt principle into the customary law of divorce so that a 
divorce could be granted only upon proof of some recognized ground for 
divorce.25
It no longer sufficed simply to show that the marriage had irreparably broken 
down.
The colonial courts held that sterility,26 impotence,27 malicious desertion,28 
cruelty,29 adultery by the wife,30 barrenness of the wife31 and a false accusation 
that the other spouse was a witch or practiced witchcraft32 were all grounds for 
divorce at customary law. ■
It may be noted that under customary law a husband is entitled to a return of 
part of the lobolo he paid whenever a marriage is terminated by divorce.33
After independence community courts, which had replaced the District 
Commissioners’ courts, continued to grant divorce on the basis of matrimonial 
fault or the guilt principle in accordance with the principles laid down by the 
colonial courts.34 Thus, until the enactment of the Matrimonial Causes Amcnd-
25 Goldin and Gclfand (supra) have succinctly put it thus: “Underlhc influence of western 
legal systems or more precisely the law of Rhodesia, a court dissolving a valid marriage 
will do so only upon proof of grounds for divorce which justify an order of divorce”, (at
' p. 148).
26 Chewa v Bvuta 1928 SR 98.
27 Nondiwa v Munwutimi 1952 SRN 29.
28 Jokonya v Diana and Machingura 1944 SRN 47.
29 Shoniwa v Risi and Mubayiwa 1944 SR 275.
30 Kamberiya v Jessie andMadiba 1943 SRN 342. Adultery by the husband could not be a 
ground for divorce since customary marriages are potentially polygamous.. ' .
31 Teresa and Gwabani v Akupusa 1958 SRN 549. Note that barrenness is not and has never 
been a ground for divorce in Ndcbclc law. Sec 11. Child, The History and Extent of 
Recognition of Tribal Law in Rhodesia, (2nd cd.), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Salisbury, 
1976, p.42.
32 Sec Bullock, The Mashona and Matabele, p.281.
33 Sec Fadzai alb Kurevawabva v Nyamandi 1978 AAC 8, Jokokonya v Diana and 
Machingura (supra), Daniel v Teresa 1972 AAc 17. These cases also decided that the 
amount of lobolo returnable depends on the duration of the marriage, the number of 
children bom, the conduct and age of the parties.
34 Sec Msusa v Sithole, Judgment No. 23 of 1983 of the Bulawayo District Court; Lanedi 
Pillie v Billie Pillie Judgment No. 4 of 1981 of the Bulawayo District Court and Jairos 
Dandara v Alice Kalsande unnumbered judgment of the District Court of Bulawayo dated 
23 May 1983.
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ment Act, No. 11 of 1987, community courts continued to dissolve customary 
law marriages on the basis of the fault principle.
C. Criticisms of the Old Divorce Law
The primary object of divorce laws should be the; identification of those 
marriages that have irretrievably broken down so that the empty legal shell can 
be dissolved with maximum fairness and-minimum bitterness, distress and., 
humiliation. Divorce laws satisfying this requirement would be understood and 
respected by society and would, it is suggested, discourage the formation of illicit 
extra-marital relationships by facilitating the dissolution of empty marriages.
The old law of divorce based on the guilt principle fell very much short of 
being a good and sensible divorce law. The fault principle is based on the 
obviously erroneous premise that there is always a guilty spouse and an innocent 
spouse in a divorce suit. A law of divorce founded on the guilt principle invents 
a guilty spouse who is the villain of the marriage drama and who alone is- 
responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. Beside this villain is.placed an 
innocent spouse who is depicted as no longer able to endure the villain’s actions 
and who is accordingly entitled to divorce. . . ■
Obviously this scenario is far removed from the realities of married life in. 
which both parties, of course to varying degrees, contribute to the failure or 
breakdown of their marriage. Trcdgold J vividly captured the reality of married 
life when in Baines v Baines35 he said:
“. . .  it is seldom in a matrimonial dispute that the faults arc all on 
. one side.”
The fault principle permits only the innocent spouse to bring an action for the 
dissolution of the marriage and thus allows the so-called innocent spouse to keep 
the so-called guilty, spouse indefinitely, bound to a marriage which has long 
ceased to exist in fact, having become an empty legal shell valid only in the yes 
of the law but dead for all practical purposes.
Further, the grounds for divorce under the fault system such as adultery and 
desertion are in reality usually the result, and not the cause, of marital break­
down. Often by the time one spouse deserts or commits adultery the marriage 
would have long broken down.
Perhaps it was in the light of these and other shortcomings of the guilt 
principle that in August 1976 the government of Rhodesia set up a Commission 
of Inquiry into the divorce laws of the country. One of the Commission’s tasks 
was to inquire into the law of Rhodesia relating to the grounds upon which a 
divorce may be granted and to “report whether any. changes in the present law 
of Rhodesia are necessary or desirable and, if so, to what extent.” The Commis-
1944 SR 135 ai p.137.35
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sion duly carried out its mandate and presented its report entitled “Report into 
Divorce Laws, 1977” to the President on 23rd September 1977. In its Report the 
Commission recommended inter alia, that the “sole ground for granting a 
divorce shall be irremediable or irreparable failure” of marriage.36
The Government of Rhodesia did not act on this recommendation until it 
collapsed in 1980 and was succeeded by the government of independent 
Zimbabwe. However, as stated earlier, the old general law grounds for divorce 
were abolished in 1985 by the independent government of Zimbabwe through 
the Matrimonial Causes Act, No. 33 of 1985. The old customary law grounds for 
divorce, however, remained operational until they were abolished by the 
Matrimonial Causes Amendment Act, No. 11 of 1987 which came into operation 
on 11th December 1987. The effect of the 1987 amendment of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act was to rationalise and unify the law of divorce so that all valid 
marriages, whether under customary law or general law, became subject to the 
same divorce laws as embodied in that Act.37 Accordingly, tire grounds for the 
dissolution of customary law and general law marriages arc now the same. The 
only difference being that general law marriages can be dissolved only by the 
High Court whereas customary law marriages can be dissolved by any court 
which is competent to apply the provisions of section 4 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act, even though in practice they arc dissolved by the community court.38
II THE NEW NO FAULT DIVORCE LAW
The new divorce law of Zimbabwe which is contained in sections 4 ,5  and 6 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act applies equally to all valid marriages.
The new divorce law of Zimbabwe which became operational on 7th 
February 1986 and which is contained in sections 4 ,5  and 6 of the Matrimonial 
Causes Act applies equally to all valid marriages whether contracted under 
general law or customary law. This is so because section 2 of the Act includes 
in the term “marriage”, marriages registered in terms of African Marriages Act, 
Chapter 238.
With respect to the new divorce law, section 4 provides that:
“A marriage may be dissolved by a decree of divorce by an 
appropriate court only on the ground of:
36 Paragraph 45.
37 This is achieved by the definition of “marriage” in section 2 where marriage is defined as 
“including a marriage contracted in terms of customary law under the African Marriages 
Act, Cap. 238.”
38 The only other court of first instance with competency to apply the provisions of section 
4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act is the High Court and hence a customary law marriage 
can be dissolved cither by the High Court or Community Court. This is because the term 
“appropriate court” is defined as meaning the High Court “in relation to any marriage” and 
a community court in relation to a customary law marriage. (Section 2).
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(a) irretrievable break-down of the marriage as contemplated by 
section five;
(b) incurable mental illness or continuous unconsciousness of 
one of the parties to the marriage as contemplated by section 
six.”
This provision is borrowed from section 3 of the South African Divorce Act, 
70 of 1979, and our law now recognizes two grounds of divorce, namely 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage and mental illness or continuous uncon­
sciousness. It may be asked why mental illness or continuous unconsciousness 
were abstracted from irretrievable breakdown and made a separate ground. It 
would appear that the legislature drew a distinction between marriages which 
have become impossible as a result of circumstances beyond the control of the 
parties, that is, mental illness or continuous unconsciousness and those mar­
riages which collapse as a result of the parties’ conduct. There appears to be no 
sound logic in this distinction for a marriage that has become impossible as a 
result of uncontrollable conditions such as incurable mental illness is, as irre­
trievably broken down as one which has failed as a result of the parties’ conduct. 
Accordingly, whether a marriage has broken down as a result of the conduct of 
the parlies or as a result of uncontrollable conditions such as mental illness 
should not be a consideration. The simple fact is that the marriage has broken 
down. The cause of the break down is irrelevant and the marriage should be 
dissolved. The uselessness of the distinction has been borne out in South Africa 
where the courts have held that a marriage can be irretrievably broken down as 
a result of mental illness or continuous unconsciousness.39 ,
It will be recalled from above that section 4 of the Act states that a marriage 
may be dissolved under certain conditions. The use of the word_‘‘may” clearly 
indicates, that the courts have a discretion to refuse to order a decree of divorce 
even if the marriage has irretrievably broken down or one of the spouses.is 
mentally ill or unconscious. If may be objected that this discretion is senseless 
and useless. Further, it could be argued that once a marriage has been shown 
to have irretrievably broken down the court should have no discretion but 
must dissolve h for the court cannot-rcsuscitatc or breathe life into a dead 
marriage. . ~~
Indeed, there is substance in such objections and arguments. However, it is 
submitted that this discretion will cause no adverse effects if it is used with 
caution and for the interests of the public and the parties concerned. It is 
suggested that our courts should refuse to order a decree of divorce where a 
marriage has been shown to have broken down only if the granting of the divorce 
would cause grave hardship to one of the parties or to the children of the marriage. 
It is emphasized that the hardship must be shown to be grave before a court
39 See Krige v Smit 1981 (4) SA 409 and Ott v Raubenheimer N.O. 1985 3 (SA 851 (0).
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exercises its discretionary.power. It is indeed most likely that our courts will 
exercise the discretion given in section 4 with great caution.40
A. Irretrievable Breakdown
The main problem presented by the concept of the irretrievable breakdown 
of marriage is'that of determining when a marriage, can be said to have 
irretrievably broken down. Section 5(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act provides 
the test for determining whether a marriage has irretrievably broken down or not 
by providing that:
“An appropriate court may grant a.dccrec of divorce on the 
grounds of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage if it is 
satisfied that the marriage relationship between the parlies has 
broken down to such an extent that there is no reasonable 
prospect of the restoration of a normal marriage relationship 
between them." (Emphasis supplied]
This means that whether a marriage has irretrievably broken down or not is 
a question of fact to be determined by reference to all the relevant facts and 
circumstances of each case. The test to be applied or the question to be posed in 
every case is: Having regard to all the available evidence is there a reasonable 
prospect that the parlies will restore a normal marriage relationship between 
themselves? If the answer is in the affirmative then the marriage has not 
irretrievably broken down and if it is in the negative then the manriage has 
irretrievably broken down and must be dissolved.
The provisions, of the above quoted test lay down two requirements for the 
dissolution of a marriage, namely that the marital relationship between the 
spouses must have become abnormal and that there must exist no reasonable 
prospect of a normal marital relationship being restored between them: Accord­
ingly, a court must first determine whether or not the marital relationship of the 
parties is normal. If the relationship of the parties is found to be normal then the 
marriage of the parties has not broken down. The question to be answered in this 
respect is, when is a marital relationship no longer normal? The answer can only 
be found by reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither 
possible nor practical to provide a general test for the identification of a marital 
relationship that is normal or not normal. In other words, it is not possible to break 
up a normal marital relationship into its constituent elements so that when one 
or more of them are absent it can be said that the marriage is no longer normal. 
However, as a general rule it can be said that a normal marital relationship no
40 Note that in Schwartz v Schwartz 1984(4)SA 467 (AD) the South African Appellate 
Division held that while the word “may” does not mean “must", nonetheless there was no 
residual discretion to permit a court to refuse a divorce if irretrievable breakdown has been 
proved. The practical effect of this interpretation is to make the granting of a decree 
peremptory whenever a breakdown is established. Grave financial or other hardship 
cannot serve in South Africa as a reason for sustaining a marriage that has become an empty 
shell. It may be that this is a correct and desirable approach.
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longer exists between the spouses, when one or both of the spouses has acted or 
acts in a manner that has brought or will bring the marriage consortium41 to an 
end.
Secondly, where the marital relationship is found to be abnormal, the court 
must satisfy itself whether or not there arc reasonable prospects that the marriage 
will be restored to its normal state. If such a possibility exists the marriage would 
not have broken down irretrievably and the provisions of section 5(3) would 
come into operation. These provide that:
“If it appears to an appropriate court that there is a reasonable 
possibility that the parties may become reconciled through , 
marriage counsel, treatment or reflection, the court may postpone 
the proceedings to enable the parlies to attempt a reconciliation.”
However, if the parlies find it impossible to reconcile after they have been 
given the opportunity to do so, their marriage can be said to have irretrievably 
broken down and it should thereafter be dissolved.
It is unlikely that the courts will have any difficulty in applying the concept 
of irretrievable breakdown to real life cases. It should not be difficult to 
determine whether or not, in each case, there is or is not a reasonable prospect 
of the restoration of a normal marriage relationship once it has been found that 
the marital relationship between the parties is no longer normal. Indeed, the. 
conduct of the parlies in court, their attitude towards each other and towards their 
marriage would.often' assist the court in deciding the question one way or the 
other.
In addition to the above test as contained bisection 5(1) of the Act, section 
5(2) provides the court with certain guidelines to assist in determining whether 
a marriage has irretrievably broken down or not. This section provides that:
“Subject to the provisions of subsection (1) and without dcroga- 
. : lion from any other facts or circumstances which may show the
irretrievable breakdown of a marriage, an appropriate court may 
have regard to the fact that —
(a) the parlies have not lived together as husband and wife for a 
continuous period of at least twelve months immediately 
preceding the dale of the commencement of the divorce 
action; or
(b) the defendant has committed adultery which the plaintiff .
. regards as incompatible with the continuation of a normal
marriage relationship; or
Consortium embraces the totality of a number of rights and duties created by the married 
status between the spouses. These include companionship, love, affection, comfort, 
mutual services, fidelity and exclusive sexual privileges. See generally, Naido v Naido 
1985(1) SA 366 CO and L v J  1985(4) SA 371 (C).’
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(c) the defendant has been sentenced by a competent court to 
imprisonment for a period of at least fifteen years or has, in 
terms of the law relating to criminal procedure, been 
declared a habitual criminal or has been sentenced to 
extended imprisonment and has, in accordance with such 
declaration or sentence, been detained in prison for a 
continuous period of, or for interrupted periods which in the 
aggregate amount to at least five years, within the ten years 
immediately preceding the date of commencement of the . 
divorce action; or
(d) the defendant has, during the subsistence of the marriage —
(i) treated the plaintiff with such cruelty, mental or 
otherwise; or
(ii) habitually subjected himself or herself, as the ease may 
be, to the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs to 
such an extent;
as is incompatible with the continuation of a normal mar­
riage relationship;
as proof of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage.42
These guidelines arc perhaps more than guidelines for it would appear that 
once the existence of one or more of the situations described above has been 
established, the court is constrained to conclude as a matter of course that the 
marriage has irretrievably broken down. Thus proof of the existence of any of the 
situations described in section 5(2) creates a presumption that the marriage has 
irretrievably broken down. It would require very strong evidence from the parly 
contesting the divorce to rebut this presumption by show ing that the marriage has 
in fact not broken down irretrievably, notwithstanding the existence of one or 
more of the situations described in section 5.(2).
Bcforcdiscussing the guidelines individually itshouldbcobscrvcd that these 
guidelines are notmeant to be exhaustive of the situations, facts orcircumslanccs 
which may show the irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This is clear from the 
use of the words “without derogation from any other facts or circumstances 
which may show the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage an appropriate court 
may have regard to. the fact that—”. Thus, the courts arc free to regard fact 
situations other than those tabulated, as evidence of the irretrievable breakdown 
of a marriage.
It will also be noticed that these guidelines bear a close resemblance to the 
old grounds for divorce based on the fault principle. The question that arises is 
w'hcthcr the formulation of the guidelines means that a “guilty” spouse cannot
42 Note that these guidelines arc basically borrowed from section 4 of the South African Di­
vorce Act (supra), except for the guideline in paragraph (d) in respect of cruelly. This 
difference is explained by the fact that cruelly was not a ground for divorce in South 
African law prior to the enactment of the Divorce Act.
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rely on his or her own contrary behaviour to establish that his or her marriage has 
irretrievably broken down in order to be granted a divorce. The question arises 
because the formulation of the guidelines in paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) is such 
that only the “innocent” spouse can sue for divorce on the basis of the situations 
therein provided. For example, in paragraph (b) the court is empowered to regard 
“the defendant’s” adultery which the plaintiff regards as incompatible with the 
continuation of the marriage as evidence of breakdown. What if it is the plaintiff 
who has committed and continues to commit adultery so that the marriage has 
broken down as a result of his or her own adultery, and he or she wishes to rely 
on this adultery to establish the irretrievable breakdown of his or her marriage?
It is respectfully submitted that the present formulation of the guidelines docs 
not detract from the generality of the general teslas provided in section 5(2). The 
material question in each ease should be whether or not the marital relationship 
of the parlies is no longer normal and, if it is not, whether or not there is a 
reasonable prospect that it can be restored to its normal slate. The question 
whether or not it is the plaintiff’s or defendant’s conduct that caused the 
breakdown is irrelevant to the determination of whether or not as a matter of fact 
the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Accordingly, it is submitted that a, 
spouse can rely on his or her own conduct, be it adultery or cruelly, to establish 
that die marriage has irretrievably broken down.
Indeed, this has been the approach of the South African courts as is illustrated 
by the facts and decision in Kruger v Kruger.43 In this ease the parties had been 
married in 1940. In 1953 the plaintiff had left the matrimonial home to live with 
his lover, one Mrs. Heyward with whom he had earlier developed an intimate 
relationship. On a number of occasions the plaintiff had pleaded with the 
■ defendant to divorce him but the defendant had refused. Aftcr.thc passing of the 
Divorce Act and the introduction of irretrievable breakdown as a ground for 
divorce the plaintiff sued for a decree of divorce asserting that the marriage had 
irretrievably broken down as a result of his own adultery. The court granted him 
divorce.
It is clear that the adultery which was the basis of the breakdown in this ease 
was the plaintiff’s and accordingly not the adultery contemplated in section 
4(2)(b) of the South African Divorce Act. Nevertheless the court granted the 
decree of divorce on the general premise that the marriage had broken down as 
envisaged in the general section, namely section 4(1). This section lays down the 
lest for breakdown as the disintegration of the marriage relationship to the extent 
that reasonable prospects of restoring it to a normal slate do not exist. It is 
submitted that the decision in Kruger v Kruger (supra) is not only a correct 
interpretation of the law but also constitutes a socially desirable approach.44
Further, this approach has been confirmed by the.South African Appellate
43 1980(3) SA 283(0).
44 It was also decided in Kruger v Kru&er that itjs  no longer necessary for the courts to 
condone a plaintiffs adultery.
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Division in Schwartz v Schwartz (supra). The facts of the Schwartz case revealed 
a sad and vain attempt by a woman to preserve her marriage of some twenty-three 
years in the face of her husband’s involvement with and desire to marry another 
woman. After the parties had been married the wife had given up her studies to 
seek employment so as to support the family which included two children of the 
marriage, while the husband continued with his studies. When the husband 
finished his studies he set up a private practice in which the wife handled the 
administrative and financial affairs. The husband later began to commit adultery 
with nurses and nursing sisters and in l977 he met one Miss Linlvell with whom 
he started an adulterous affair which subsisted for some five and a half years 
before he eventually brought the action for divorce. The husband had in fact lived 
with Miss Lintvcll for ovcr.2 years in a home of their own before he brought the 
divorce action:
In his evidence the husband slated that he wanted to have his marriage 
dissolved so that he arid Miss Lintvcll could marry each other. He declared that 
he would be very despondent, upset and emotionally disturbed were his relation­
ship with Miss Lintvcll to be terminated. He, however, admitted that he still 
admired and respected his wife (the respondent) whom he regarded as “a good 
woman” and a “true and supporting wife”. However, he did not have for her the 
love which he had for Miss Lintvcll.
On the other hand die respondent testified that she wished, despite every­
thing, to preserve her marriage with her husband (the appellant) whom she still 
^ loved “very; very much”. She did not believe that her husband no longer loved 
her and pointed out how happy their marriage had been before Miss Lintvelt 
came onto the scene. She further slated that she was totally dependant on the 
appellant and the grant of a decree of divorce would cause her grave financial and 
other hardship.
The trial judge had found that the husband was “passing through a period of 
uncertainly” and that his behaviour in a court was “an indication of abject 
misery” with no trucdcsircof completely breakinghis relationship with his wife. 
Accordingly, he was denied a decree of divorce on the basis that irretrievable 
breakdown had not been proved!
On appeal by the husband the Appellate Division held that the appellant had 
established that his marriage had irretrievably broken down and was entitled to 
a decree of divorce. The court slated that moral right and wrongs were not in issue 
and that irretrievable breakdown can come about as a result of the errant conduct 
of one spouse in spile of the steadfast dcsi re of the other to continue the marriage. 
The court also held that grave financial or other hardship could not serve as a 
reason for sustaining a marriage that had been shown to have irretrievably broken 
down.45
The decisions in Kruger v Kruger and Schwartz v Schwartz (both supra) are
See also Malyila v Malyila 1987(3) SA 230 and Kritzinger v Kritzinger 1987(2) SA 357.45
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a correct interpretation of the law. It is hoped that Zimbabwean courts would 
adopt the same approach since it is totally consistent with the language of 
sections 4 and 5 of the Matrimonial Causes Act.
It is also relevant to refer to two further decisions of the courts of South 
Africa. InKrige v Smif6 the plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant 
for a decree of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage 
in terms of section 4 of the Divorce Act. The defendant had suffered incurable 
brain damage and had been hospitalized but had not been in a state institution for 
a period of at least two years as is required by section 5(2) of the Act. Nor had 
the defendant been continuously unconscious for a period of 6 months even 
though he was paralysed and in a semi-conscious state. The court held that 
irretrievable breakdown had been established and that, the plaintiff was entitled 
to an order of divorce on that ground, she not being obliged to rely on the ground 
of incurable mental illness or continuous unconsciousness under which the 
defendant would have had to have been in a state institution for a period of two 
years or. to have been in a state of unconsciousness for a period of at least six 
months.
Again in Oil vRaubenheimerNO (supra) the court found that, as the marriage 
had irretrievably broken down long before the plaintiff’s wife had entered a 
mental institution and been certified as mentally ill, the plaintiff was entitled to 
rely on section 4(1) of the Divorce Act and was not obliged to rely on his wife’s 
mental illness within the framework of section .5 of the Act. The fact that the 
breakdown had occurred as a direct result of the wife’s mental illness was held 
to be irrelevant.
1. Factors Indicating Breakdown
a. One Year Separation
Paragraph (a) of section 5(2) provides that the court may regard as evidence 
of irretrievable breakdown the fact that “the parties have not lived together as 
husband and wifcfor a continuous.pcri.Qd.Qfat Jcasf twcl vc months” immediately 
preceding the date of commencement of the divorce action as a ground for 
divorce. Two questions arise from this provision. Firstly, what is meant by the 
term “have not lived together as husband and wife”? It is submitted that this 
phrase does not merely refer to geographic or physical separation but incorpo­
rates the termination of consortium. Thus, spouses who have lived under the 
same roof but have, for a continuous period of 12 months, terminated the 
consortium between themselves by, for example, ceasing to have sexual rela­
tions, are included in the guideline. However, parties seeking to rely on not 
having lived “together as husband and wife” when they have in fact lived under 
the same roof would be required to prove that even though they lived in the same 
house, their consortium had ended and that this termination had lasted for the
45 ■
1981(4) SA 409.46
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required period of time. In short, it is submitted that it is enough to satisfy the 
requirements of section 5(2)(a) to prove that although the parties have lived 
under the same roof they have not in fact accofded each other the consortium 
omnis vitae for a continuous period Of 12 months. In that event they would not 
have lived together as “husband and wife” for the required period of time.
On the other hand, termination of consortium would be presumed in eases in 
which the parties had been physically separated for a period of 12 months or 
more. Thus the mere proof of geographical or physical separation for the required 
period would suffice to satisfy the requirements of the relevant provision.47
The second point arising from section 5(2)(a) is that in order to satisfy the 
requirements of paragraph (a) the parties must have lived apart for a continuous 
uninterrupted period of 12 months. Accordingly, the requirements of the 
guideline would not be met in cases in which the 12 months of separation had 
been interrupted by an attempt or attempts to reconcile. However, this docs not 
mean a decree of divorce cannot be ordered in these circumstances. The 
guidelines arc not absolute and therefore do not have to be wholly satisfied before 
a marriage can be said to have broken dOWh irretrievably. An unsuccessful 
attempt at reconciliation, which interrupts the period of separation, may in fact 
be an indication that the marriage is beyond salvage. However, if a divorce is to 
be granted where the period of separation has been interrupted by an attempted 
reconciliation, it would have 10 be granted under the general test of irretrievable 
breakdown and not under the specific provisions of paragraph (a) of section 5(2). 
This is so since it remains open to the parties to prove that even though their ease 
docs not fall squarely into any of the listed fact situations their marriage has 
nonetheless broken down irretrievably.
b. Adultery
Paragraph (b) empowers the court to regard the fact “that the defendant has 
committed adultery which the plaintiff regards as incompatible with the continu­
ation of a normal marriage relationship” as evidence of breakdown.
The word adultery, of course, carries its usual meaning as discussed above 
in connection with the old law of divorce. Adultery must be proved on a balance 
of probabilities. However, unlike under the old law mere proof of adultery docs 
not appear to satisfy the requirements of paragraph (b). In addition to proving the 
act of adultery the plaintiff must further convince the court that he or she finds 
the adultery incompatible with the continuation of his or her marriage. It is 
submitted, however, that the courts should presume that the plaintiff regards the 
adultery as having been destructive of the marriage unless the contrary is shown 
in all cases in which the act of adultery has been proven. In other words, the 
further requirement that the plaintiff must show that he or she finds the 
continuation of his or her marriage intolerable as a result of the defendant’s
See for example Aiuchada v Muchada IIC-H-346-86 where the High Court dissolved a 
marriage on mere proof of physical separation for 12 months.
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adultery should be presumed to have been satisfied whenever the act of adultery 
has been proved. Indeed, the fact that the plaintiff has brought the divorce action 
would indicate that he or she regards the act of adultery as having been 
destructive of the marriage relationship.48 This argument is further supported by 
the fact that the test for the determination of whether or not the plaintiff finds the 
adultery to be incompatible with the continuation of the marriage is completely 
subjective. Indeed, an allegation by the plaintiff that he or she regards th e , 
adultery as incompatible with the continuation of his or her marriage cannot be 
rebutted so that the plaintiff’s allegation to this effect is sufficient to satisfy the 
requirement of paragraph (b). This should also be true in cases where the plaintiff 
has had sexual intercourse with the defendant after the discovery of the adultery 
since the question of condonation is irrelevant under the breakdown principle. 
In other words, unsuccessful attempts at Condonation, reconciliation or resump­
tion of sexual relations do not destroy the plaintiffs entitlement to divorce 
because the question,that concerns the court is whether the marriage has broken 
down or not. Thus, an unsuccessful resumption of sexual intercourse, merely 
serves as further evidence of the fact that the marriage has broken down. The 
plaintiff’s stance would simply be that in spite of his or her efforts at reconcili­
ation he or she is unable to reconcile himself or herself to the fact that his or her 
spouse had sexual intercourse with someone else.
Accordingly, the position taken by the old law that condonation (presumed 
where sexual intercourse took place between the spouses after the discovery of 
the adultery)of the defendant’s adultery by theplaintiff extinguishes the adultery 
as though it had not taken place is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not the 
marriage has irretrievably broken down. If the plaintiff insists that notwithstand­
ing the attempted condonation he or she cannot reconcile himself or herself to 
continuing the marital relationship the marriage should be regarded as having 
irretrievably broken down.
Zimbabwean courts have so far granted divorce on the ground of irretrievable 
breakdown caused by adultery in the cases of Shonge v Shonge andAnor49 and 
Mhlanga v Kateya,50 However, in both these cases the actions for divorce were 
not opposed for the parties were agreed that the acts of adultery and other factors 
had resulted in the breakdown of their marriages.
c. Imprisonment
Paragraph (c) empowers the court to regard the fact that a spouse has been 
sentenced to imprisonment for a period of at least 15 years or has been declared 
a habitual criminal and has served five years of his or her sentence as evidence 
that his or her marriage has irretrievably broken down. This guidcl inc is identical 
to the old ground of divorce provided for in section 3(b) of the repealed 
Matrimonial Causes Act, Chapter 39 and therefore needs no further explanation.




However, it is submitted that there is nothing to prevent a plaintiff whose 
spouse has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment Shorter than 15 years, or 
who has not served the required five years of the sentence, from relying on the 
general principles of irretrievable breakdown to obtain a decree of divorce. The. 
basis for divorce in this-tase would be that the commission Of the crime and the.: 
subsequent conviction dind imprisonment of the defendant have resulted in the 
breakdown of the marriage. As long as it can be shown that the commission of 
the crime and the subsequent imprisonment have in fact resulted in the irretriev­
able breakdown of the marriage the general requirements of breakdown would 
have been satisfied and there would be no need to refer to the provisions of the 
guideline in paragraph (c).'
Indeed the formulation of this guideline seems unreasonable. There appears 
to be no logical reason for setting the'defendant’s sentence at 15 years in order 
to qualify as a ground for divorce when shorter sentences would also seriously 
disrupt a marriage. Further, there are few criminal offences that attract such long 
terms of imprisonment. Even more unreasonable is the requirement that the 
defendant should first serve 5 years of his or her Sentence before the plaintiff can 
rely on the guideline to obtain a decree of divorce on the basis that the marriage 
has broken down as a result of the defendant’s conviction and subsequent 
imprisonment. This provision becomes even more unreasonable upon compari­
son with paragraph (a) of section 5(2) which entitles a spouse to rely on a mere 
12 months separation as evidence of breakdown. In any event, a plaintiff whose 
spouse has been in prison for 12 months can rely on the fact of the 12 months 
separation as evidence of breakdown in terms of paragraph (a) since the spouses 
would not “have lived together as husband and wife” for the period required by 
the paragraph. Twelve months separation caused by imprisonment is as much 
evidence of breakdown as any separation of 12 months’ duration regardless of 
the cause.
It is submi tted, therefore, that this guideline Would have made more sense and 
would have been more effective, if conviction and a sentence to any term of 
imprisonment had been considered sufficient evidence of breakdown. The 
plaintiff would simply be asserting that he or she cannot reconcile himself or_ 
herself to living with a convicted criminal.
d.. Cruelty
Under paragraph (d)(i) the court may regard the fact that the “defendant has, 
during the subsistence of the marriage treated the plaintiff with such cruelty” as 
is incompatible with the continuation of the marriage as proof of the irretrievable 
breakdown of the marriage. Under paragraph (d)(ii) the fact that the defendant 
has subjected himself 6r. herself to the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs 
in a manner or to suchVan extent as is incompatible with the continuation of a 
normal marriage relationship may also be taken as proof of the fact that the 
marriage has irretrievably broken down.
Cruelty retains the rncaning ascribed to it under the old law. It remains some 
grave conduct which has caused or is likely to cause danger to the life, limtTor
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health, physical or mental,.of the other party. Again, as under the old law, an 
intention to injure the other party is not a requirement for an action for divorce;
on the ground of cruelty, .
In Khoza y Khoza, the High Court ruled that the fact that plaintiff had:
(i) indulged in intimate relationships with other women;
(ii) failed to adequately maintain the defendant and the children;
(in) pursued his pleasures without regard to the defendant and
the children; and
(iv) deserted the defendant without just cause
amounted to such cruelty as rendered the continuation of the marriage insupport­
able.51 2
Whether a spouse’s conduct amounts to cruelly or not is a question of fact that 
has to bo determined on the particular facts of each case. The court must be 
satisfied that the conduct complained of bears the character of cruelty in that it 
is so much more damaging than the ordinary wear and tear of married life that 
the defendant can no longer be expected to endure in Once the plaintiff has 
proved that the defendant’s conduct bears the character of cruelty the court, as 
a matter of course, should conclude that the cruelly is incompatible with the 




The principle of irretrievable breakdown is a vaguc.conccpt which does not 
casilylcnd itself to precise definition. The question of whether ornot a particular 
marriage has irretrievably broken dow n is a matter to be decided by the court and 
accordingly depends quite heavily on the discretion of the court. However, the 
court’s discretioa-islimited. particularly in caseswhcrc thc parties have agreed 
that their marriage has broken down and.ought to bddissiSvcd. In such situations 
the parties would simply agree that the defendant would not challenge the 
. plaintiff’s allegation of iirctricvablc breakdown. In this event, the court would 
have little option but to accept the plaintiff’s unchallenged evidence and grant
51 IIC-B-t 06=87.
52 Sec also Mfijali v Mujali UC-M-505-87 where a divorce was granted on the ground of ir­
retrievable breakdown based on cruelly whose particulars as outlined by the plaintiff had 
not been challenged by the defendant; Masocha v Masocha IIC-II-183-87 where it was 
decided that the fact that the defendant improperly associated with other men and failed to 
treat plaintiff with love, affection and consideration amounted to cruelty which rendered 
the continuation of married life insupportable and B v B 1969(2) SA 584 (R) where it was 
stated that “his excessive drinking and negligent behaviour and perpetual dishonesty must 
have been a source of great unhappiness to his wife.”
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a decree of divorce.53 In these circumstances, therefore, divorce would essen­
tially be available on the consensus of the parties. Indeed, this is true of any 
divorce law including that based on the fault principle for panics can always 
agree to choose the most convenient ground on which to seek divorce and further 
agree that the defendant would not defend the action. Thus, any law of divorce 
allows opportunities for divorce by consensus.
B. Mental Illness or Continuous Unconsciousness as Grounds for 
Divorce
As indicated earlier, irretrievable breakdown and incurable mental illness or 
continuous unconsciousness of one of the parties are the only two grounds of 
divorce recognized in Zimbabwe under section 4 of the Matrimonial Causes Act.
It has been indicated above that the distinction between irretrievable break­
down and mental illness or continuous unconsciousness is unsound since mental 
illness and continuous unconsciousness arc clearly variants of irretrievable 
breakdown.54 For this reason, it is likely that this ground of divorce would be 
unpopular in practice and that spouses would more readily rely on the ground of 
irretrievable breakdown in most cases including cases in which mental illness or 
continuous unconsciousness are involved.
The circumstances in which incurable mental illness or continuous uncon­
sciousness of the defendant would amount to a ground for divorce arc laid down 
in section 6 of the A ct This section provides that:
“(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2), an appropriate 
court may grant a decree of divorce on the grounds of 
mental illness or continuous unconsciousness of the defen­
dant if satisfied, as the case may be, that -r-
(a) the defendants suffering from a mental disease or 
defect and has been under care and treatment for a 
continuous period of, or for interrupted periods 
which in the aggregate amount to, at least five 
years, within the ten years immediately preceding 
the date of commencement of the divorce action; or
(b) the defendant is by reason of a physical disorder in 
a state of continuous unconsciousness which has 
lasted for a period of at least six months immedi­
ately preceding the date of commencement of the 
divorce action;
See, for example Mhlanga v Kateya IIC-II-427-86, Mujali v Mujati (supra); Masango v 
Masango HC-H-107-87 and Masocha v Masocha IIC-H-183-87. In al] these cases the 
plaintiffs evidence was unchallenged and the courts had to accept that evidence and grant 
divorce. There is little choice in these circumstances.
See for example the decisions of the South African Courts in Krige v Smith (supra) and Ott 
v Raubenheimer NO (supra) both discussed ibid.
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i and that there is no reasonable prospect that he will be cured 
or will regain consciousness, as the case may be.
(2) An appropriate court shall not grant a divorce on any ground 
referred to in subsection (1) unless it is satisfied by the 
evidence of at least three medical practitioners, of whom two 
shall be psychiatrists appointed by the court, as to the 
matters referred to in paragraph (a) or (b), as the case may 
be.
(3) For the purposes of this section a person shall be deemed to 
be under care and treatment —
(a) while he is detained in pursuance of any order or 
warrant issuod under the law of Zimbabwe or of 
any other country which relates to mental disorder; 
or
(b) while he i.s receiving treatment as a voluntary 
patient under any such law;
and in no other case,”
The requirements of this section are self-evident and require little elabora­
tion. To obtain a divorce on the ground Of mental illness, the plaintiff must satisfy 
the epurt that ^
(a) the defendant is suffering from a mental disease or defect;
(b) the defendant has been under care and treatment, that is to 
say, he or she has been demined in an institution as a mental 
patient or has been voluntarily receiving treatment as a 
mental patient, for a period of five years within the ten years 
immediately preceding the dale of commencement of the 
action;
(c) there is no reasonable prospect that the defendant will be 
cured;
(d) there is evidence from three medical practitioners, at least 
two of whom are psychiatrists, confirming the above three 
matters, namely that the defendant is suffering from incur­
able mental disease or defect and has been under care and 
treatment for a period of 5 years.
To obtain a divorce 00 the basis of continuous unconsciousness the plaintiff 
must satisfy the'court that
(a) due to a physical disorder the defendant is in a slate of 
continuous unconsciousness;
(b) the state of continuous unconsciousness has lasted for a 
period of at least 6 months immediately preceding the date 
of commencement of the divorce action;
i
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(c) there is no reasonable prospect that the defendant will regain 
consciousness;
(d) there is evidence from at least three medical practitioners, of 
whom two must be psychiatrists, confirming the above 
matters, namely that the defendant has been unconscious as 
a result of a physical disorder for a continuous period of at 
least three months with no reasonable prospect that he or she 
will regain consciousness.55
55 There is as yet no Zimbabwean casein which divorce has been granted on this ground and 
it is unlikely that there will be one in the foreseeable future.
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